ANALYSIS: General Hassan's trial in Algeria is aimed at the whole DRS

ALGIERS – The trial of General Abdelkader Ait Ouarabi, better known as General Hassan, last Thursday before the military court in Oran can be seen as more than just a trial of one man; it can be viewed as the trial of the whole Algerian secret services (DRS).

Ouarabi was a central figure in the counter-terrorism battle in the 1990s. He also served as the head of the Scorat (intelligence elite unit) for 15 years before being forced to step down in 2013 and then being arrested this August. He has now been sentenced to five years in prison for "non-compliance with instructions" and "destruction of military records". He has vowed to appeal against the ruling.

Such a harsh verdict triggered strong responses. Despite the case being heard behind closed doors, Mokrane Ait Larbi, Hassan’s lawyer, denounced what he said amounted to "violations of the defence’s rights" and the admission of testimony taken from "a big trafficker with several arrest warrants under his name".

Ali Benflis, a former presidential candidate and political opponent to long-time President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, even spoke of "political cleansing for non-allegiance crime".

Louisa Hanoune, general secretary of the Workers’ Party, criticised an "abject, shameful and scandalous parody" orchestrated by "a parallel power".

"Hassan pays the price of being close to Toufik [real name Mohamed Lamine Mediene, who headed up the DRS before being forcibly retired by Bouteflika in September],” a DRS officer told Middle East Eye on the condition of anonymity. 

“In 2004, when Hassan launched an investigation into a corruption affair, in which the army’s chief of staff at the time, Mohamed Lamari, was mentioned, Toufik came to his [Hassan's] rescue by appointing him as head of the Scorat unit under his leadership."

The DRS and the army have long been rivals in Algeria and the embroilment of one side of the security services in a corruption case like this was seen as an act of aggression that could have cost Hassan his job were it not for Toufik’s intervention.  

This help, however, now looks like it may have doomed General Hassan once the political tide turned against his superior.

'King of intelligence'

According to Major General and former defense minister Khaled Nezzar, who denounced "a criminal and infamous conviction" following Hassan's arrest in August, Toufik had, once again, tried to help him by sending a letter to the head of state in which he explained "the ins and outs of this case" and declared himself "responsible for everything that can be criticised" in general.

The letter was sent shortly after Hassan’s arrest, during the summer, while Toufik was still head of the secret services, but it clearly failed to win his deputy’s freedom.

According to a former head of the counter-terrorism unit who knew him, Hassan has been especially criticised for his "insubordination," which has irked the army and others in the DRS.

"He is a cowboy who always acted on his own. But he was very effective in dismantling the terrorist networks. He is a pro in intelligence," the source told MEE on the condition of anonymity.

"His fall from grace is due to an undercover operation on the Libyan border where he had sent his men to track down Mokhtar Belmokhtar [the Algerian leader of the al-Murabitoun, a group loosely affiliated to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb].”

Another DRS officer familiar with the issue told MEE that while “Hassan’s men did not arrest Belmokhtar, they managed instead to neutralise an armed group and seized several tons of weaponry including French missiles.

"On the way back, Hassan’s men were caught by soldiers of sixth region who thought that they were terrorists. The soldiers finally let them go at Tamanrasset [an oasis town in southern Algeria], but when they sent the seized weapons to Algiers, the military accused them of leading a coup,” the source said. “Hassan, who considers himself accountable only to Mediene [Toufik] dismissed them. And when the army chief of staff Ahmed Gaid Salah was briefed about this, he went mad."

This quarrel has to be put in the context of the previous balance of powers: on one side, Gaid Salah and the staff, behind Bouteflika, and on the other side Hassan and the DRS obedient to the orders of Toufik, who was then the head of the secret services.

The rift began in 2011 when DRS corruption probes began to get very close to the president's innner circle. It then intensified in 2013 when the DRS tried to oppose Bouteflika, who had a stroke that year and has been in very poor health since, from standing for a fourth presidential term. In the end, Bouteflika and his camp won and the ailing president sailed through to victory, securing 81.5 percent of the vote despite having not personally campaigned due to poor health. 

This is not the first dispute to emerge between the military staff and the secret services. During the hostage-taking crisis on the Tiguentourine oil base in January 2013 (also known as the Amenas hostage crisis), Hassan and Athmane Tartag (now the new chief of DRS) disagreed with the commander of the fourth Ouargla Military Region - Gaid Salah. He was willing to negotiate, while the DRS wanted to launch an assault that ultimately resulted in the death of almost 40 foreign nationals.

DRS old guard

"We knew from the beginning that the trial [of Hassan] would not be fair," said a separate DRS officer who also spoke to MEE on the condition of anonymity.

"In September, Gaid Salah had deliberately placed a new prosecutor at the head of Oran’s tribunal just for Hassan because some military judges refused to endorse the trial. He wanted to make it clear that he was the leader. This is not good for the military, which must pledge allegiance to a country, not to a man."

Most commentators now agree that General Hassan will serve as an example to others to get in line.

General Djamel Kehal Medjdoub, former head of the presidential guard, was also charged in late November for "negligence" and "a breach of military instructions" during a shooting at the presidential residency in July that was considered an assassination attempt or a possible coup.

Akram Kharief, a specialist on defense issues and moderator of the Secret Difa3 blog, said, however, that it was necessary to contextualise the prosecution.

"Many officers inside the army and the DRS have welcomed the turn of events," he told MEE. "Especially among young officers who, since the 2002 purges [which saw several high-ranking retirements] suffer a kind of inertia and 'mediocracy' and saw their careers blocked by these old military chiefs, who were glued to their posts but failed to modernise the institution despite the restructuring plans that have been outlined."

A similar view was echoed by political scientist Rashid Tlemcani, who said he hoped to place the events in "the broader context of civil-military relations’ consolidation”.  

"We are witnessing the end of the Cold War generation. To survive, the DRS must restructure and may finally integrate the young officers trained abroad who had been sidelined," he told MEE, while recognising that it is impossible to ignore the context of "clan war" between the presidency and the DRS.

"Then, the reading is simple: the presidential circle has won, so it eliminates the elements that cause problems,” he said.

Translation from French (original) by Ali Saad.