2014: The year Israel's long-standing 'truths' collapsed

During the last conflict in Gaza, I had almost daily conversations with a colleague of mine from Bethlehem. They were gloomy talks, filled with fear, dismay and shame. But one shared thought gave us some hope for the future: that someday, people would look back at this summer war and say it was a game-changer, one that changed Israeli-Palestinian relations just as the 1973 war changed relations between Israel and Egypt.

When the war ended on August 26, though, our thoughts seemed more like wishful thinking than a realistic assessment: the siege on Gaza continued and Israeli policy remained the same, despite the heavy price Palestinians paid during the war, and the difficulties the Israeli army encountered.

But after reading Ramzy Baroud’s words about 2014 being a game-changing year for Palestinians, it struck me that maybe my Palestinian friend and I did not have it so wrong.

Maybe for Israelis, too, 2014 was a crucial year, a year in which old perceptions according to which Israel acted for many years were weakened, or died altogether.

Negotiations are not forever

US Secretary of State John Kerry set April 29 as the date by which Israelis and Palestinians were to reach an agreed-upon framework for a peace agreement. From the beginning of 2014, however, it became clear that this goal would not be achieved.

The Americans hoped that they could at least convince the two sides to prolong the negotiations for another nine months, but this too failed.

From the Oslo agreement in 1993 onwards, Israel and the Palestinians have carried out near-constant negotiations. These negotiations had their peaks – the Camp David conference in May 2000, for example – and their lows, like during the second Netanyahu government from 2009 to 2013. But they always limped on.

In many respects, the negotiation process became a goal in and of itself in the eyes of many Israelis, not a tool to reach a final agreement with the Palestinians. The very fact that Israel was negotiating with the Palestinians was meant to give the state protection against international pressure, while allowing it to continue its policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

This was most evident under Ehud Olmert’s government, which came to power in 2006. Olmert prided himself on the fact that engaging in negotiations with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas allowed him to wage two destructive wars – one against Hezbollah in Lebanon and one against Hamas in Gaza (Operation Cast lead) – without facing international pressure or condemnation.

The failure to resume a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians in April 2014 cut off this long chain of negotiations. Further, President Abbas’ decision to form a unity government with Hamas and then set out on a road for unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state – culminating in the current proposition put before the UN Security Council – made it clear to Israel that it can no longer use negotiations as a cover to maintain the status quo.

If Benyamin Netanyahu is re-elected prime minister in March 2015, it is difficult to see how it would be possible to resume negotiations. If Labor party leader Yitzhak Hertzog takes his place, negotiations will resume under a very strict timetable. It seems that a never-ending process is over.

This is not a trivial change, either. Israel’s growing isolation is a direct result of the dissolution of negotiations. If this will turn into a permanent reality, Israel's position will certainly weaken.

The Oslo agreements gave Israel international legitimacy; their final breakdown may reverse many of these gains.

Limits of military power

It is hard to describe the results of Operation Defensive Shield as an Israeli military failure. Hamas did not achieve its major goal in the conflict: lifting the blockade on Gaza. Instead, Gaza is in ruins, more than 2,000 Palestinians – most of them civilians, but a at least a few hundred of them combatants – lost their lives, Hamas' military capability was badly hurt, and so is its willingness to resume fighting any time soon.

Israel’s losses were not minor, either: 72 people were killed, including 67 soldiers, much of the country’s economy was paralysed for 50 days, Ben Gurion international airport was briefly shut down, and tourism almost came to a standstill.

But Israel military’s capabilities were not even remotely damaged, and it had no trouble maintaining the siege on Gaza. Ever-improving relations with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, himself focused on fighting Hamas, strengthened Israel's position towards the Palestinian group.

Yet despite these relatively positive results, something deep has changed for Israel. During the second Lebanon War in 2006, Israel suffered heavier losses, but was fighting a well-trained and well-equipped organisation. Hezbollah enjoyed the direct support of a sovereign country, Iran, and was able to move in and out of the frontlines with relative ease.

Hamas had none of this. Its weapons were mostly primitive and self-manufactured, and it was locked in a tiny sliver of land, cut off from support from the outside world. Yet Israel, with the biggest army in the Middle East, failed to crush the small organisation or force it to renounce fighting.

Worse still, by telling the government that taking full control of the Gaza Strip "will take years" and cost hundreds of Israeli soldiers’ lives, the Israeli army effectively admitted that reoccupying Gaza is not on its agenda, and that there is a limit to what Israeli can do with its mighty power. It is no wonder that extreme, right-wing ministers like Naftali Bennet were outraged; they quickly understood the deeper meaning of this statement.

Operation Defensive Edge was perhaps the first direct military confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians held on Palestinian land since 1948; the two Palestinian intifadas had different characters, and the 1982 war between the Palestine Liberation Organization’s military forces and Israel took place in Lebanon.

The fact that the summer’s war in Gaza did not end in a crushing Israeli victory could be easily interpreted to mean that Israel cannot solve its conflict with the Palestinians by force.

The status quo is cracking

When the outgoing Netanyahu government was formed in March 2013, one of its central, unwritten principles was maintaining the status quo. It was only upon this basis that the annexation-loving Bennett, and middle-class hero Yair Lapid, formed an alliance.

As finance minister, Lapid was meant to fight the cost of living. As economy minister, meanwhile, Bennett was left to expand Jewish settlements in the West Bank. It was clear for both ministers that no change was expected in Israel's relations with the Palestinians in the near future.

The sudden and unexpected breakdown of the government in November, therefore, was very much a reflection of the breakdown of the status quo after the war in Gaza.

Netanyahu himself represented this status quo more than anyone else. The man described as King Bibi by Time magazine in May 2012 earned his title by giving Israelis a long period of calm, free of military conflicts and terror attacks, and a relatively stable economy. His fall from grace – even if he does manage to win the upcoming elections – represents a growing uncertainty among Israelis about the future.

Many are afraid that the road Netanyahu paved is leading them to nowhere.

In a recent poll published by +972 magazine, support among Israelis for the status quo fell sharply. When asked which general vision for the future of the conflict they prefer, 56 percent opted for the two-state solution, 25 percent said they preferred an “unequal" one state on the whole of historic Palestine (where Arabs will have less rights than Jews), 10 percent wanted an equal one state, and only 10 percent thought that the continuation of the current state of affairs was good for them.

This is a significant result. Eran Etzion, a former top official in the Israeli foreign ministry, said that the Israeli political map could be divided into two camps: the "status quo party", and the "peace settlement party". For many years, the former was on a steady rise, while the latter fell.

The last war in Gaza, sporadic Palestinian attacks on Israelis in Jerusalem, the West Bank and even inside Israel, and a growing feeling of international isolation have caused the "status quo party" to lose support. Netanyahu may yet still win the elections, but he will find it hard to convince Israelis that things should stay as they are.

With negotiations fading away, limits of power more clear than ever before, and the status quo losing its relevance, Israel is entering into a new phase: it is too early to say where it will lead, but it may be that 2014 was the year this significant change really began.

Meron Rapoport is an Israeli journalist and writer, winner of the Napoli International Prize for Journalism for a inquiry about the stealing of olive trees from their Palestinian owners. He is ex-head of the News Department in Haaertz, and now an independent journalist.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

Photo Credit: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (AFP)