The bill of loneliness rises for Turkey
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The Turkish AKP (Justice and Development) government’s ambitious foreign policy has ushered in an era of extreme isolation, which was also acknowledged by President Erdogan on his return from a visit to several Latin American countries. Although he insisted that he personally did not care about loneliness (which he believes is simply due to certain leaders’ jealousy), Turkey is increasingly affected by its political elite’s inability to foster reliable alliances.
For the AKP government, this isolation is a great contrast to its aspirations to turn into a regional power. As it has continually been pronounced during recent years, the Turkish government has been longing for a sphere of influence in the vast Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, based on the postulate that Turkey already had room for expansion due to historic and religious ties. The Arab uprisings of 2011 were perceived as the awaited opportunity to exert larger regional influence by allying with emergent forces, mainly Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated or other political groups with predominantly Sunni Islamic sensibilities.
Turkey’s increasing loneliness essentially stems from the annoyance of skeptical western powers concerned with AKP’s rapprochement with the Muslim Brotherhood and inaction against radical Islamic groups, and, more significantly, that of regional secular forces accusing the Turkish government of intervening in their domestic affairs.
The anti-AKP feelings was voiced ever more loudly as these Western-backed forces began to gain ground during the past year. However, akin to Erdogan’s above display of self-confidence, the Turkish government does not seem to go along with the dictates of regional powers, often at the expense of its diplomatic and economic interests.
Losing further ground in Libya
The decision taken on Sunday by the official Libyan government to ban Turkish firms was the latest evidence of the severe tension between the AKP government and the region’s secular forces. The move is strongly linked to AKP’s perception as an external actor involved in domestic struggles and it is essential to briefly examine the Libyan context to understand its implications.
The decision is taken by the Abdullah al-Thinni government, nominated by the House of Representatives (HoR) based in Tobruk, which is recognised by the United Nations as the official parliament of Libya. Being dominated by secular parties, it was composed after the legislative elections of June 2014 in order to replace the interim General National Congress (GNC). Initially functioning in the capital Tripoli, the HoR was forced to relocate in August 2014 when the Islamic “Libya Dawn” group seized control in the capital and re-founded the General National Congress (GNC). In November 2014, the Libyan Supreme Court based in Tripoli ruled that the June elections and HoR were unconstitutional. Currently two rival administrations claim power, the GNC controlling the west and the HoR controlling the east of Libya.
In line with its ongoing tendencies since the Arab uprisings, the Turkish government aspired to good relations with the GNC and its majority political group, the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction Party (JCP). The relations were consigned to Emrullah İşler, former deputy prime minister and Islamic theologian who currently serves as President Erdogan’s special advisor on Libya. İşler visited both Tobruk and Tripoli in October 2014, becoming the first foreign diplomat to meet with the GNC and its political leader Omar Al-Hassi while they were boycotted by most of the international community.
Since then, the AKP government has been perceived as a threat by the Tobruk-based government. According to the Prime Minister al-Thinni, the Turkish government has a negative impact on Libya’s security and stability by supporting Islamic militias and dealing with the GNC. The tensions between Tobruk and Ankara have been escalating incessantly, reaching a dangerous tone in January when the Libyan Air Forces loyal to al-Thinni government declared that all Turkish civilian or military forces would be shot down if they entered Libyan airspace.
The decision to ban the Turkish firms was the second harsh step by the Tobruk government against the AKP’s alleged support for rival groups and Islamic militia.
The Turkish government declares itself as neutral and denies these allegations. It officially calls on all parties in Libya to enter in political dialogue for national unity. However, as al-Thinni’s accusations suggest, the AKP government seems to be stigmatised as pursuing a pro-Islamic agenda due to its previous and ongoing regional policies.
The cost of 'dealing with GNC'
Although it is not clear how the decision on Turkish firms will be implemented within Libya’s chaotic environment, there will certainly be negative drawbacks.
Considering the divisions in the country, it can be reasoned that the decision will only apply to the east of Libya controlled by the HoR. However, the Turkish business community, like all economic actors, requires legal guarantees and it is the internationally recognised al-Thinni government that has the monopoly to announce public procurements and sign business contracts with foreign companies. As stated by the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK), the Turkish firms are getting prepared to leave the country as the decision applies to the whole of Libya.
When the Libya crisis began in 2011, Turkish firms in the country had a turnover of $15bn. Most of them functioned in the construction sector and invested $7bn on machines and other equipment. They are also waiting to collect their receipts worth $4.5m.
Although the Turkish firms are weighing whether to seek international support or appeal to international courts, such attempts would take a very long time given the current state of affairs. There are ongoing UN peace talks between Tripoli and Tobruk governments. At this stage, the international community would refrain from any decision that would put pressure on al-Thinni. Moreover, his claims could well be appropriated by a considerable part of the international community already annoyed with the AKP.
Against this background, Turkey’s immediate economic interests depend on whether or not the AKP will align itself with the Tobruk government. However, the Turkish side has so far followed an opposite path by questioning the legitimacy of the official government and rejecting its decisions.
Despite clear economic damages, it is very unlikely that the AKP will reconsider its posture until there is a solution in Libya that fulfils not its own, but the GNC’s aspirations.
Although initially aspiring to regional power, the Turkish government seems to be carried away with an unexplained cause which allows access only to a limited number of power contenders, many of them deprived of international recognition. Whether it is due to a pro-Islamic, pro-Ottoman or a pro-democratic cause (as suggested by the AKP itself), such a devotion amid incessant regional turmoil is astonishing and time will tell what Turkey will gain from it.
- Ozan Serdaroglu has research experience on Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean, with a focus on political and economic development, Euro-Med relations, conflict management, regional cooperation and energy issues.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
Photo: Skeptical western powers are concerned with AKP’s rapproachment with the Muslim Brotherhood and inaction against radical Islamic groups (AFP)New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch
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