Iran adopts low profile on Scottish independence

As the future of the United Kingdom hangs in the balance, one country that could be expected to champion the cause of Scottish independence has remained surprisingly quiet on the issue.

Unlike other major countries, the Islamic Republic of Iran has resisted declaring a position or even an official opinion on the issue of Scottish independence. In view of the centuries old volatile Anglo-Iranian relations and the Iranian establishment’s deep-rooted Anglophobia, it is indeed surprising that the Islamic Republic hasn’t publicly relished the prospect of constitutional chaos on the British Isles.

This position (or lack thereof) can be partly explained by the pragmatism of the Iranian foreign policy establishment. As an opponent of British foreign policy, Iran desires a weaker United Kingdom on the global stage, but Iranian leaders are likely not entirely convinced that Scottish independence will necessarily deliver that outcome.

Moreover, as a multi-national state, Iran is not naturally well-disposed toward separatist movements for fear they may set an inspirational or rebellious example to Iran’s own separatist groups.

Beyond foreign policy and strategic issues, Iranian policy makers are also likely concerned by the potential repercussions of Scottish independence within the polity and society of the remaining UK. There is a fear that a rising tide of English nationalism, or even at best a retreat into “little England” mentality, may adversely affect the UK’s Iranian and broader Muslim communities.

Striking back at the UK

The official silence hasn’t stopped Iranian online news and analysis sites, especially those linked to hardliners, and associated social media platforms from vocally and at times provocatively supporting the cause of Scottish independence.

The opinions expressed on social media depict the referendum in simple terms by reducing the independence cause to a revolt against English “colonialism.” Anti-British Iranian bloggers often depict Scotland as England’s “first” colony and paint the three hundred year union of England and Scotland as an act of subjugation, which in spirit, if not substance, is consistent with the UK’s broader colonial heritage.

These expressions of acrimony are rooted in Iranian perceptions of the UK’s interventionist role in Iranian affairs beginning in the early 19^th century and culminating in the early 1950s. Iranian Anglophobia is unique both by its depth and by its endurance.

Public opinion coincides with establishment views and aspirations on the perceived opportunities resulting from a potentially weakened United Kingdom. Some Iranian social media posts have expressed a belief that Scottish secession will automatically weaken the remaining UK in all spheres thereby eroding Britain’s influence on the world stage. 

Notwithstanding the fact that the Iranian establishment does not disagree with the historical foundations of popular Anglophobia, but more relevant to the establishment is the UK’s contemporary policy toward Iran and her allies. For example, there is widespread anger at the UK’s perceived interference in internal Iranian affairs, specifically at the broadcasting content of the BBC Persian service and UK support for selected dissidents. 

There is undoubtedly a privately expressed hope in some quarters of the establishment to the effect that constitutional chaos on the British Isles will lead to a significant erosion of remaining UK political, strategic, diplomatic and even economic capacity, thereby blunting the effect of established UK positions on major global issues and trends.

In so far as the Iranian establishment views the UK as an important enabler of American policies on the global stage, some Iranian leaders and officials may be privately hoping that a weakened UK will in the long run blunt US resolve. This would therefore make it easier for Iran to achieve its core strategic objective, namely the expulsion of the United States from the Middle East.

Pragmatism Prevails

Privately expressed hopes and aspirations - even at the highest levels of government - do not of course necessarily translate to official positions. It is to some extent a credit to Iran’s dense policy making apparatus that it can resist considerable popular and establishment prejudices and pressure to arrive at a position that is most in line with the national interest. On this issue, that position appears to be neutrality on the question of Scottish independence.

Although purely speculative, what is likely to have taken place over the course of the past 24 months is a careful study of the issue of Scottish independence and its ramifications by the Iranian foreign policy establishment. The experts are likely to have arrived at the conclusion that Scottish secession is unlikely to weaken or modify British positions on issues that impact Iranian national security and interests.

The Islamic Republic does not fear the UK’s military and associated capability. On the contrary, it has every confidence it can defeat the UK in any Middle Eastern arena, most recently in southern Iraq where Iranian support for Shiite militias (2003-2008) was crucial in scuppering British plans in the area.

What Iran fears most is the UK acting as a force multiplier for US diplomatic and other soft power capabilities in the region. From the Iranian point of view at least, this unique British role and capability is unlikely to be affected or modified in the event of Scottish secession.

Beyond these core issues, Iran like other countries with restive minorities, does not view the extended referendum debate and campaign (much of which was conducted in good spirits) in favourable terms. If Scotland walks away from the United Kingdom in a legal, considered, and civilised manner, then that may well set a precedent for other separatist causes around the world. Countries like Iran and Spain will not appreciate this precedent.

Finally, the Islamic Republic will be worried about a tide of Islamophobia and racism sweeping across the remaining UK, particularly in England where there is considerable potential for ugly nationalism. There is a sizeable Iranian community across the UK and there is a well -founded fear in Tehran that even relatively mild forms of English nationalism and expressions of “little” England mentality will adversely affect the economic, cultural and even possibly physical well-being of this community.  

 Mahan Abedin is an analyst of Iranian politics. He is the director of the research group Dysart Consulting.  

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

Photo: Piper Ryan Randall leads a pro-Scottish independence rally in the suburbs of Edinburgh on 18 September, 2014 (AFP)