Why al-Qaeda, not IS, will win the longer war

After Syria’s Nusra Front announced last month that it was splitting from al-Qaeda and renaming itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS or Levantine Conquest Front), some analysts said that al-Qaeda was weakening both in Syria and globally. 

Other observers have regarded the split as a long-term strategy that may empower al-Qaeda. I subscribe to the second viewpoint: here's why.

The reasons for splitting with al-Qaeda

The Nusra Front has been debating this split with al-Qaeda for more than two years. At times, this discussion has arisen at the request of their local allies in Jaish al-Fatah (The Army of Conquest), such as Ahrar Asham. 

But it has also come at the behest of private donors, who are not comfortable sending funds directly to the group, and also by countries supporting the Syrian opposition, like Qatar, which does not want to be seen aiding a designated terror organisation.

Nusra made the decision to split with al-Qaeda at this moment for two reasons: first, it feels threatened by a Washington-Moscow deal on Syria; and secondly, American and Russian air strikes in Syria in April saw it lose Abu Firas al-Suri, their number two man and spokesman and a prominent member of the Egyptian group Jamaa Islamia Rifai Taha, which is perceived to be close to al-Qaeda.

Both al-Qaeda and Nusra took this position to protect their standing in Syria and also to raise funds and weapons. The decision appears to have paid off: a new assault by JFS to break the siege of Aleppo seems to be working, despite full Russian backing of regime forces in the city.

During the weeks leading up to Nusra’s announcement, it became apparent that the local population in Syria and beyond, despite their pleas for intervention, could not depend on any support from Western countries. 

The only groups that they could rely on to break a Syrian government blockade - supported by Russia, Iran, Hezbollah and other Shia militias - were jihadist groups, led by JFS, and individuals ideologically linked to al-Qaeda, like Sheikh Abdullah al-Mohaisany, a well-known wealthy Saudi preacher in Syria, who was filmed entering a besieged area of Aleppo like a conqueror. Recently he announced that he would pledge allegiance to certain factions and encourage other rebels to defect, most likely to the JFS.

All of this will give JFS and al-Qaeda the image they desire... to defend Islam and Muslims during a moment of fear

On Tuesday, he announced a unity initiative, under the banner of "A Unifying Year" and started shaming any rebel groups - either from the Free Syrian Army or Islamist rebels - who are resisting unity. Many rebel groups are now in negotiations to join: JFS is expected to have the lion's share of influence upon local government, political bureau and new funding.

The majority of main rebel groups have decided to wait before announcing if they plan to merge with JFS, although many are already cooperating with it under the Army of Conquest banner in a military operation room northwest of Idlib and Aleppo provinces. Some organisations appear to be planning to become parts of JFS, including the Islamic Party of Turkistan and Uzbekistan groups. 

All of this combined will give JFS and al-Qaeda the image they desire, not only as a unifier but also as a dependable force to defend Islam and Muslims during a moment of fear.

Now here is the scary part...

While JFS may become this saviour, there are also bigger issues to consider. During my time in Syria in 2014 and 2015, I visited several Islamic schools that are filling the education void created by the long civil war. Some were operating solely as conveyor belts for preachers to meet the newly-found high demand for Islamic clergy in Syria.

One that I visited in Idlib province is based on a theology that I like to call "vanilla Wahabism" - a simple orthodox Salafist education with an emphasis on faith, unity of God, prayers rules and some principles of jihad. But another school gave me pause: when I visited in spring 2014, my fixers told me that it belonged to Nusra Front.

It had a six-month education curriculum, after which graduates could go out and lead prayers, provide simple answers to Islamic Sharia questions and, more importantly, be versed in the rules of jihad, based on al-Qaeda ideology.

I asked how many students had graduated. They said that within the past year, 800-plus preachers had finished the programme. How much was the budget, I asked. I was told that around $24,000 per month, mostly from Saudi Arabia and private donors.

Many FSA soldiers were not particularly religious before the war, but their leaders would like to provide some spiritual guidance to energise the rebels. With a lack of clergy, these leaders take what they can get – even someone trained in al-Qaeda ideology and theology.

With the global community focused on Islamic State and ignoring finding a quick path toward the end of the Syrian crisis, we may defeat IS on the battlefield, but we will be faced with a more localised, disciplined, well-funded, well-armed and more lethal al-Qaeda shortly afterwards.  

Mohamed Okda is a political consultant, focused on political Islam in the Middle East, active in the issues of interfaith, crisis mediation and assessment, the economics of conflict and religious–secular dialogue. He is the founder of Insight into Crisis, a conflict advisory. He tweets @okdamohd.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

PHOTO: Having taken military positions, fighters from the former Nusra Front listen to a speech at an armament school (Omar Haj Kadour/AFP)

This article is available in French on Middle East Eye French edition.