How Israel's wars and Trump comeback are changing Iran's national security doctrine
On Tuesday, Donald Trump was elected as the 47th president of the United States. During his election campaign, he promised to end the war in the Middle East, which helped him gain the support of Muslim-Americans and Arab-Americans.
Israel’s devastating wars on Gaza and Lebanon, along with back-and-forth attacks involving Iran, have brought the Middle East to a boiling point, amid the prospect of a disastrous, all-out regional conflict.
Over the past year, almost all of Gaza’s 2.3 million people have been displaced, while nearly a quarter of the Lebanese population have fled their homes. It is estimated that the death toll in Gaza, including both direct and indirect deaths, could ultimately exceed 186,000.
More than 15,000 Lebanese people have been killed or injured, and most of Gaza has been levelled by Israeli bombs, with schools, hospitals and residential homes destroyed.
Israel’s strategy to eradicate Hamas and Hezbollah, coupled with Iran’s full support for the axis of resistance and the Palestinian people, have fuelled the military confrontation between Tel Aviv and Tehran. This could turn into a prolonged back-and-forth conflict, shifting Iran’s national security doctrine and the regional political landscape.
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However, Trump is entering the White House at a time when Iran is on the verge of changing its national security doctrine.
Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, three events have led to major shifts in Iran’s national security doctrine.
The first came in the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran was hit with sanctions amid regional and international support for the aggressor, Iraq, even as Saddam Hussein’s regime used chemical weapons.
This experience pushed Iran towards a strategy known as “defensive self-reliance”, through which it prioritised the domestic production of military equipment, including ballistic missiles.
Moreover, Iran sought to project power beyond its borders to deter potential aggressors by threatening their interests in the region. Iran’s support for movements such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Yemen’s Houthis stems from the experiences of the eight-year war, coupled with continued western sanctions and pressures, seen in Tehran as being aimed at regime change.
'Neither war nor peace'
The next shift came in 2018. While Iran was fully complying with its commitments under the nuclear deal, former US President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement and reimposed sanctions on Iran, using secondary sanctions to force Tehran’s major trading partners to do the same.
In response, Iran expanded its nuclear programme and produced uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels. It also made a major pivot towards establishing broader political and economic relations with eastern bloc powers, including full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Brics.
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Towards the US and the West more generally, Iran adopted a policy of “neither war nor peace”, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stating: “There will be no negotiations and no war … Negotiating with people who break their promises, who go back on their commitments, and who are not committed to anything - they are not committed to morality, to legality, to international conventions and to anything - is ridiculous.”
The third and final shift is happening today. The US and Nato’s carte blanche support for Israel’s wars on Gaza and Lebanon, along with the assassinations of top Hamas, Hezbollah and Revolutionary Guards commanders, are spurring the development of a revised Iranian national security doctrine defined by six elements.
Stability and security in the Middle East requires an end to the ongoing hostilities between Iran and the western world
Firstly, Nato has become an enemy. Its continuing supply of weapons for Israel’s indiscriminate attacks on Gaza and Lebanon, along with one-sided calls for Iranian restraint, have led Iran to conclude that Nato, as well as Israel, is its adversary.
As Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently said: “Israel does not stand alone.” Iran’s previous strategy of deterrence against the US and Israel may thus shift to deterrence against Nato, including its European members.
The second element is Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence is on its agenda. At this stage, Iran is a nuclear threshold state facing direct military attacks on its territory by Israel, with Nato’s support. Kamal Kharrazi, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, recently noted that Iran may review its nuclear doctrine, after a survey earlier this year showed that nearly 70 percent of Iranians agreed the country should possess nuclear weapons.
Thirdly, Iran may be looking to upgrade the axis of resistance in the wake of Israel’s targeted assassinations. With Israel managing to infiltrate the upper echelons of Iran’s security establishments, Iran and the groups it supports may undertake fundamental reforms to their organisational, security and communications structures.
Alliance with the east
Indeed, previous assassinations have failed to defeat Israel’s adversaries, and the latest strikes against Hamas and Hezbollah could fuel the rise of a new generation of resistance.
“If we believe that the damage done to Hezbollah’s leadership and the elimination of [Yahya] Sinwar and other Hamas leaders somehow translates into a new dynamic for peace, that we can somehow lever that into a visionary global settlement - that way lies madness,” former US ambassador Ryan Crocker, who spent decades working on Middle East diplomacy, told Politico.
The fourth element of Iran’s evolving national security doctrine is an alliance with the east. Nato’s military support for Israel will likely push Tehran to consider a long-term military alliance with eastern powers. While the current military cooperation between Russia and Iran has laid the groundwork for such a policy, it is unclear whether China or India would be future partners
Fifthly, there is Iran’s acquisition of air defence systems. Iran has relatively strong offensive missile capabilities, but it needs to enhance its defensive capabilities against Israel’s missiles and F-35 fighter jets. Russia’s willingness to provide Iran with Sukhoi Su-35 jets and/or S-400 air defence systems will indicate whether their relations will reach the level of a strategic partnership.
Finally, Iran’s previous strategy of “neither war nor peace” may turn into “both war and peace”. As Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi recently noted: “The Islamic Republic of Iran does not seek an escalation of tension, conflict and war, although it is ready for any situation. We are prepared for war as we are prepared for peace.”
As the continuation of a military confrontation between Israel and Iran, along with Israel’s ongoing attacks on Lebanon and Gaza, threaten a widespread regional war, the main losers would be the US, Israel and Iran. Diplomacy is the only option to avoid an unmanageable situation in the Middle East. Mass killings, assassinations and the destruction of public infrastructure cannot bring peace; rather, they will increase hatred, extremism and hostility.
Trump has the chance to end the Israeli wars against Gaza and Lebanon and to curb the military confrontations between Israel and Iran.
Containing the current crisis in the Middle East will require a ceasefire between Iran and Israel; an end to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Gaza; and an exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hamas. The implementation of UN resolutions on a two-state solution would also mark a significant step towards the security of the Middle East region.
Ultimately, stability and security in the Middle East requires an end to the ongoing hostilities between Iran and the western world. A comprehensive and serious dialogue must get underway.
Such talks will increase Trump’s chances for a grand deal with Iran
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
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