Egypt’s election: A brief post-mortem

To the surprise of no one (save perhaps a coterie of die-hard conspiracy theorists), Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has been elected Egypt’s new president. His opponent, Hamdeen Sabahi, enjoys the dubious distinction of essentially having come third in a two-candidate race; more people spoiled their ballots than voted for him.

What was surprising, however, was the lengths to which the government had to go to ensure a level of turnout that it would not deem mortifying when the inevitable comparisons were made with the 2012 presidential election, to date, Egypt’s only free vote for its head of state.

Understandably, the electoral commission chose to make much of the heat; a populace unwilling to vote because of the weather is apparently more tolerable than a populace unwilling to vote because the outcome was known months in advance of the actual balloting. Still, electing presidents by acclamation does not look good in this day and age, and if people would not vote when offered a public holiday and given an opportunity of two days, perhaps they would be more willing to do so if given an extra day. A massive shopping mall was shut. Transportation was free. Television anchors berated the voters ceaselessly, and the government threatened them with a $70 fine, equivalent to about six weeks’ wages for a quarter of the population living below the poverty line.

In all likelihood, there were several reasons why one would not vote. A reassertion of political apathy is likely a chief culprit here. As was the case under the Mubarak presidency, it is difficult persuading citizens to line up and vote to endorse an outcome long-since decided. An interesting question is how much of the apathy is “benign” versus how much of it is reflective of rejectionist conviction. For example, it is almost certain that some people who would have voted for Sisi simply did not bother turning up because they were confident that the outcome they favoured was guaranteed irrespective of their contribution or lack thereof: the quintessential political free riders.

There’s also a fine line between political apathy and a decision not to engage on principal; in fact, they look the same, and short of the individual stating his motivations, it’s impossible to tell them apart. Is there a difference between one who chooses not to vote because the result is a foregone conclusion and engagement is a waste of time, and one who chooses not to vote in protest because he feels the political process is profoundly flawed and engineered to be impervious to the choices of the electorate? An intangible one, certainly. Both reflect some form of disillusionment with the process, but produce similar results in this given situation. The difference may well prove crucial down the line, but in the meantime, attempts to chalk up the low turnout as a victory for a particular political stance appear somewhat premature.

However, the release of the results of a Pew Research Center survey offers some insight into public attitudes that likely helped shape the result, in term of the turnout. In face-to-face interviews with a thousand respondents, Pew found that, despite media portrayals of Sisi as overwhelmingly popular, only 54 percent of respondents expressed a positive opinion of him. Similarly, the survey found that favourable impressions of the military had declined by 17 percent year-on-year, with perceptions of the courts suffering similarly. The Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity dropped more precipitously, by 25 percent. What’s interesting here is that only one of those three has been subjected to an intensive demonisation campaign in public and private media, and been proscribed as a terrorist organization. In fact, former President Morsi is still viewed favourably by 42 percent of respondents.

There is, of course, an unyielding core of Islamist opposition with views that are likely to prove fairly inelastic over the short term. But the low turnout, in conjunction with the survey, could contribute to a reading in which the low turnout is seen as a broader manifestation of growing opposition, or perhaps more generally, disillusionment.

One element that perhaps did not receive as much attention as it should is the role of the ancient regime. There has been speculation for a while now as to where Sisi would turn to develop an organised base of support, with rumours of jockeying for position by various elites. Many observers took it for granted that Sisi’s endorsement by the military guaranteed that the old regime would largely fall in line. But Arabic social media pages were rife with rumours that one reason for the low turnout was that local strongmen chose to stay on the sidelines. Central to the state’s get-out-the-vote efforts in the past, they resisted their role this time around, apparently angling for more influence with the incoming regime by demonstrating that they could provide an indispensable service, and perhaps offering a practical counterpoint to Sisi’s claim that he is indebted to no one.

As the Associated Press reported, the low turnout on the first day drove the government into a panic, prompting conference calls with various officials - and local “notables,” who were asked to help ensure local citizens went out to vote - their traditional civic duty, so to speak. According to the AP, some of those notables point-blank refused to cooperate, angered by a recent court ruling that banned members of the former National Democratic Party from running in elections.

Others, quite naturally, knew better than to look a gift horse in the mouth, and apparently seized the opportunity. We may have to wait until upcoming parliamentary elections to figure out what exactly they were promised by the government, or what payment they plan to exact for services rendered to the president, but it is perhaps possible to speculate that it won’t be anything that benefits democracy and the rule of law.

Potentially insalubrious political accords aside, it’s impossible to dispute the figures in a process as tightly controlled as this was. There are no independent counts available. Suffice it to say, many have expressed scepticism over the alleged spike in turnout on the third day of voting, including Sabahi, and little about the conduct and context of the process invites confidence. But it is difficult to argue against the assessment that the interim authorities were shaken by the unexpected display of apathy towards the vote. 

There is, of course, a central irony here. The political apathy on display (if, in fact, that was the central motivator for the low turnout) which so distressed the interim authorities, is often a precious commodity where authoritarian regimes are involved. A docile electorate that is uninvested in politics is likely a good thing to have when you’re the type of president who professes to be scandalised by calls for freedom of speech and the right to protest. Ideally, such governments want to find the political sweet-spot, a level of popular engagement that enables them to trot out supporters for token protests when required, and to command a reliable level of turnout in elections held within tightly defined parameters, but not to the point where people might actually begin to believe they can contest the regime’s grip on power. 

On that note, another interesting take-away from the Pew survey: 72 percent of respondents are dissatisfied with the country’s direction. That's, as Pew says, “roughly the same today as it was before the revolution that removed Mubarak from office.” If there’s one thing the Arab uprisings have demonstrated, it’s that public political apathy can never be taken for granted.

Aziz El-Kaissouni is a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and a former political analyst for the European Union Delegation to Egypt.  

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

Photo credit: Egyptians celebrate in Cairo's Tahrir Square on 3 June as Abdel Fattah al-Sisi reported to win 96.9 percent of votes in presidential election (AFP)